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199(0 338. 98-dc20 89-77542 CIP conflict is one of the central phenomena of economic iife. In Argen tina, for example, about a dozen general strikes have occurred during the presidency of Raul Alfonsin, and many of these were marked by widespread mobilization, deep political rancor, and violence. Eco nomic policy inaking i Laiin America remain:; a battleground of con flicling classes, sectors. regions, and ethnic groups. It is not accidental that one of the mo.I highly regarded studies of Argentina is entitled Economic Policyinaking in a Conflict Socict (Mallon and Sourrouille 1975) . This title could apply equally wVCl throughout most of Latin America.
Because of the salience of distributional issues in Latin America, leading Latin American economists have long specialized in dssecting the dis.ributional implications of macroeconomic policies and have often made such distributional analysis the cornerstoine of their theoriz ing. Examples i,,lude Carlos F Piaz-Alejandro's (1965) celebrated analysis of 'contractionary devaluation.-which is based on the idea that devaluation reduces real wages and thereby transfers income from low savini, workers to high-saving landowners: Albert lIirschman's (,971) remarkable ,ssay on the political bases of the iniport-substitut ion strategy: and the highly influential "'dependency theory" of Cardoso and Faletto ( 1979) .
The bitterness of class and ,ectoral conflicts throughout Latin America almost surely reflect the extreme iiequalities of income distri bution throughout the region. As shown in the first column of Table I , the income inequalities in Latin America tend to he much larger than in Other regions of the world.-The difference is particularly marked with respect to East Asia, which has an unusually low degree of income inequality in comparison widh the rest of the developing world. As discussed belo'' (and as shown in Table I , column 2), countries with high income inequality were especially prone to suffer a debt crisis in the 1980s--as indicated by the need to reschedule their external debt payments.
Just as East Asia's economic successes seem to be tied to the social stability engendered by the greater income equality, many of Latin America's economic ills seem to be rooted in the intense conflicts prompted by the extremes of income inequality. InLatin America, necessary d1tvaluations are frequently dela:,ed because they favor rents earned on land and primary commodities at the expense of real wages. Trade policies remain excessively inward oriented throughout much of the region, partly because of tile presumption that outward orientation reduces urban wages apd increases the profits of exporters-wealthy landowners and producers of primary commodities. Fiscal austerity is often rejected, even in highly inflationary circumstances, because of' the fear that the austerity will provoke widespread unrest. Whether these concerns are realistic or not, they form much of the basis for the widespread opposition in Latin America to "orthodox" recipes for ad justment to macfoeconomic disequilibria. This paper looks in some detail at one common type of policy failure in Latin America, the populist policy cycle. In his 1981 essay "Latin American Stabilization Plkus," Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro provided a bril liant and succinct account of economic populism that is very much in line with the findings of this paper. This particular type of Latin American policy making, characterized by overly expansionary macroeconomic policies that lead to high inflation and severe balance-of-payments crises, has been repeated so often, and N,h such common characteristics, that it plainly reveals the linkages from social conflict to poor economic performance. 3 Economic populism hlps to explain the fact that in 1988 no less than four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Peru) in Latin America had inflation rates of several hundred percent or more, while in the rest of the world there was not a single case of triple-digit inflation. 4 Four other Latin American countries had infla tion rates between 50 and 100 percent: Ecuador, Me,;ico, Do;ninican Republic, and Uruguay. Of course, external factor, also contributed significantly to Latin America's current crisis.
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This paper is highly critical of the populist approach, and provides considerable historical evidence that populist experiments tend to end in economic and political disaster. Nevertheless, it should not be read as an indictment of the aims of populist leaders (e.g., a more equal distribution of income in societies with extreme income inequaliiy), but of the specific macrocconomic strategies used to try to achieve the aims. Neither is the paper an endorsement of' the extreme forms of' "orthodoxy" that often follow the collapse of a populist experiment (e.g., in Pinochet's Chile after the fall of Allende in 1973). More than anything else, the swings from populism to extreme orthodoxy prove the failure of' i-atin America to have found a basic consensus, and middle way, in political, social, and economic terms. Note, finally, that economic populism (at least as the term is used in this study) IVIs been adopted by governments representing a wide range of the political spectrum, and has not been the exclusive province of the left or right. Governments of' the right (as in the case of the Brazilian military in 1979-80) have employed populist economic tactics of the same style as those employed by left-wing governments (such as in Chile under President Allende). Also, "revolutionary" governments, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, often follow a fairly traditional populist mode in their macroeconomic tactics.
I begin my analysis by examining the similarities of' macroeco nomic policies in Latin America and move on to develop a simple model of how populist policies operate in Latin America. Following this, I provide a brief historical overview of the four case studies considered in this paper and then quantitatively demonstrate the com monality of these episodes. I conclude by discussing some of the reasons for the repeating of populist failures and by examining the implications of this study for future policy directions.
Distributional Conflict and Macroeconomic Policies
The central hypothesis of this paper is that high income inequality in Latin America coniributes to intense political pressure to use macro economic policies to raise the incomes of lower-income groups, which in turn contributes io bad policy choices and weak economic perfor mance. The chain of causation from inequality to economic policy to economic performance is, of course, highly complex and variable acro:;s time and countries. It is also difficult to prove. Before turning to the central example of populisit policies, it is useful to first examine some circumstantial evidence.
In a recent paper, Andrew Berg and Jeffrey Sachs (1988) looked for structural characteristics of middle-income developing countries that could help to explain why some countries succumbed to a debt crisis inthe 1980s and others did not. The paper developed a cross country statistical model of debt rescheduling that linked the probabil ity of a particular country's having rescheduled its debts in the 1980s to several structural characteristics of the country, including the extent of income inequality (as eCastured in Table I ). Our most striking find ing was that countries with high income inequality had a significantly greater likelihood, ceteris paribus, of having rescheduled their debts than did countries with low income inequalily.6
Berg and Sachs attribute tile correlation between high income in equality and debt rescheduling to the nature of political manaigement in economies with extreme inequalities of income. There are several rea sons why countries with extreme income inequality might be-prone to excessive foreign borrowing. High income inequality: * raises the pressures for overly expansionary redistributive budgetary policies * enhances the power of economic elites to resist the taxation needed to balance the budget * contributes to direct, destabilizing labor militancy Social Conflict aml PolmlistPolicies decreases the po!itical support fbr export-promotion measures, which tend to threaten urban real waces in the short run It is probably al o true that in many couniries a high level of social conflict, rooted in high income inequality, contributes to weak political institutions and a rapid turnover of governments. Moreover, govern mnts with a brief expected tenure and that represent particular constit uencies may find it attractive to maximize the culrrnt income of those constituencies by running down the country's future purchasing power (e.g., by depleting tile international reserves). Alesina and Tabellini (1987) have demonstrated this point in a formal theoretical sett ing.
The debt crisis of the 1980s is only the most recent case in which Latin American countries have shown a special proneness to large bud.et deficits that produce balance-of-payments crises and episodes of I ieh inflation. There are numerous cases in Latin Amer ica where governments have rapidly and significantly increased bud,t deficits in meet goals. term order to distributional 1 these extreme cases "populist" episodes. In all of these experiments, gov ernments have expl icitly argued that the policies are necessary to correct glaring inequii ities in income distribution and raise the living standards of the poor. Much of tile t2,mptation of such policies, despite the fact that they generally fail to achieve their goals except in the very short term, relates to the factors just outlined: high pres sures for increasing the living standards of lower income groupS. short tenure of governmeats. inability to tax elites in order to cover social spending. and so forth.
The-e is also a particular structural characteristic of many Latin American economies that increases the populist temptation. Becausc many Latin American countries have a sharp sectoral division be tween a iabor-intensive nontradables sector and a primary resource intensive export sector, monetary and fiscal expansions can raise urban real wages markedly in the short run, as well as profits in the nontradable sector, at the expense of the wealthy primary-resource owners. In the context of the deep and continuing distributional battle between these groups, expansionary policies are thus particularly at tractive in the short run for governments based on an urban, working class constituency.
Before turning to a macroeconomic framework lor understanding economic populism, it is worthwhile to note some of the historical roots of these policies. As described by a large number of studies in political science and economic history, Latin American politics under went an enormous change with the rise of extensive urbanization in the 1920s and 1930s. 7 After a long history of elite-based politics centered on a rural landowning class, a new wave of urban-based political lead ers emerged. drawing thCir support from a multiclass base of the urban proletariat, urban government employees of a growing public sector, and the marginalized urban population (i.e., the informal sector). In political terms, "poptlisil" signifies these urban. multiclass move ment, which at least initially were headed by a charismatic leader who came to power through electoral competition with the support of the newly enfranchised urban proletariat. As stressed by Drake (1982) , the leaders of the new populist movements came to power promising tile "immediate psychic and material gratification of the needs of society's underldogs-(. 2u,).
As summarized by Conriff (1982) and Drake (1982) , the early populist movements, such as in Argentina utnder Juan Peron and in Brazil under Getulio Vargas. shared many basic characteristics includ ing an urban. multiclass base: accession to power by winning an elec tion with the support of the urban working class: charasmatic leadership: and a focus on state activism to incorporate workers "in a process of accelerated industrialization through ameliorative redistrib utive measures" (Drake 1982, p. 218) .
Interestingly, these populist leaders and their successors generally relied more on distribttive policies rather than redistributive policies: they looked for ways of' raising the incomes of the lowest classes without resorting to explicit taxation or confiscation of property of the upper classes. Sometimes, this neglect of' taxation of the upper incomes was the result of the temperament of' the populist leader and his follow ers. and sometimes it simply resulted from the fact that the populist leader lacked the political power to implement and enforce new forms of' progressive taxation.
A macroeconomic framework for economic populism. Consider the following macroeconomic model, which is spelled out in more de tail in Sachs (1989) . Suppose, as is typical of Latin America (at least as a crude simplification), that the economy has two major sectors: an export sector based in primary commodities and a nontradable sector of services and manufactures (where many manuflacturers survive behind a protectionist barrier). The nontradables sector is heavily labor-intensive relative to the export sector. Aside from labor inputs, the riontradables sector also relies heavily on imported intermediate inputs in the produc tion process. In the export sector, there is an important fixed tctor of production (e.g., land in the Argentine Pampas), whose ownership is highly concentrated anong wealthy households. It is assumed that the export sector also uses some nontradable goods, such as transport, in the production process.
Assume fixed exchange rates ii, the shorl run, and capital controls on private outflows. The exchange rate is fixed by the central bank as long as it has foreign-exchange reserves available for that purpose. When the central bank runs out of ,e. erees, the exchange rate collapses and there is a shift to floating rate.,. During the time that the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the domestic currency price of commodity exports, as well as the price of imported inputs, Ibor the nontradable sector, is fixed, under the assumptions of purcha:ing power pauity (PPP) and a given world price for these goods. When the exchange rate eventually depreci ates, after the loss of reserves and subsequent balance-of-payments crisis, the domestic prices of the tradable goods rise in eqtuiproportion to the exchange-rate depreciation. Now consider a nonetary expansion; for simplicity, assume that money growth isincreased oi a sustained basis in order to finance a higher level of real government transfers or subsidies to the private sector. With capital controls in place. the monetary expansion raises real money balances, lowers domestic interest rates, and expands de mand. Because the exchange rate is fixed, the domestic price of the import and export goods remains unchanged. The rise in domestic demand pushes up the demand for nontradable goods, and that in turn leads to a rise in demand for labor used in the nontradable sector. The rise in labor demand pushes Lip the nominal wage. Higher wage costs in turn push up the price of nontradables.
Under reasonable assumptions, the nominal wage will tend to in crease by more than the nontradables price. This happens because nontradables have two inputs, labor and imported intemlediate goods, and the price of the imported inputs does not increase as long as the exchange rate remains fixed. Therefore, thr nominal wage rises rela tive to the price of nontradables, imports, and exports. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the monetary expansion leads to an increase in real consumption wages, defined as the ratio of nominal wages to the price of consumption goods. To put the same result another way, real wages rise as the real exchange rate appreciates (where the real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of export goods prices to nonexport goods prices, and an appreciation signifies a fall in the relative price of tradables).
Several other phenomena will accompany the real exchange-rate appreciation. The price of exports will fall relative to the price of nonexports. To the extent that the export sector uses the nonexport good as an input, Ohe real appreciation will lead to a profit squeeze in the export sector and to a decline in export production. This export decline will accompany a rise in demand for the imported input to nonexport production that will lead to an overall trade deficit. Note that in some countries---especial!y Argentina, which exports food--export goods are also important consumption goods. In this case, the rise in the nominal wage relative to the price of the export good is another reason !o expect a rise in the real wage.
If this were the end of the story, as most populist leaders want to believe!, there w'ould be a happy ending to the expansion. Real wages and nonexport output go up. If the household labor supply rises in response to higher real wages, so too does overall employment. Profits earned in the export sector would go down, but since the ownership of resources it, the export sector is highly concentrated among upper ir.come groups. the political ramifications of the profit squeeze would be slight, or even favorable, for a government based on urban wage laborers. The problem, however, is the trade deficit that accompanies the expansion. This must be financed by atloss of foreign-exchange reserves, or equiv:ilently, by a growing foreign debt if foreign creditors are willing to make new loans; eventually, the reserves or the borrow ing capacity will run dry.
The overall expansion may continue until a balance-of-payments crisis hits, when the economy runs out of the foreign reserves and borrowing capacity needed to continue to peg the exchange rate. At that moment, the nominal eAchange rate depreciates sharply and by enough to create a real depreciation that lowers real wages, restares exprti rofitabililty. and reduces internal demand by reducing the lexel of reai money balances and thus tightening credit once again. The real wage gains of the expansion phase are eliminated. The real deprecia tion m,.st be large enough to immcdiately bring the economy back intc. trade balance, since thee isno morc external financing available to run trade deficits. In fact, under rea!istic circumstances the real deprecia tion must be (xreater than the initial real app,'eciation since, in the expansion phase, the econom" lost the income of its initial stock of foreign exchange (which is now depleted) and has probably lost capac ity in the export sector, because of decapitalization. By extension, the fall of the real wage on dhe way down must surely be greater than the initial teal wage boost.
if the initial budgetary expansion that started the process is not reversed a! the ime of the balance-of-payments crisis, the economy will be left with an expansionary monetary policy under floating ex change rates. The result will be a sustained rise in inilation. After the exchange rate collapse, the budget deficit isessentially financed by the inflation 'ax under floating exchange rates, rather than by running down reserves under fixed exchange rates.
It should be noted that populist governments in Ihe collapsing phase of the cycle tend to improvise to try te forestall a reversal of the initial gains. Instead of allowing a discrete devaluation of the currency, for example, authe moment that reserves dry up, they may implement exchange controls to ration the scarce foreign exchange. This leads to a black-market premium on foreign exchange that tends to raise the domestic price of importables (which are paid for, on the margin, with black-market dollars) relative to exports (which must be remi.,ed to tlhe central bank at the official rate). The short-tenn result is a further anti-export bias and an incentive for export underinvoicing and smug gling. Eventually these distortions prompt an official devaluation and a reunification of the exchange rate for current account transactions. Most governments in the final stages of the populist cycle will also implement vage and price controls in an unsuccessful attempt to pre vent the collapse of real wages. As with the exchange controls, the price controls simply lead to black markets, hidden price premia, shortages, and eventually to an elimination of the controls after the distortions become unbearable. Governments may even turn to more extreme measures, such as te nationalization of the banks seen in Mexico in 1982 and in Peru in 1987.
Note that it is the environment of unresolved social conflict that spurs this kind of populist policy cycle. In practice, there are always voices of opposition to excessive domcstic expansion, who warn cor rectly that the benefits are likely to be sh.ort lived because of the balarce-of-payments constraint. It seems to be the urgent politicali pressure for real wage increases that pushes policy makers to favor an otherwise risky, indeed imprudent, strategy. Moreover. the expansion ary policy is attractive only when the interests of the nontradable, sector politically dominate the interests of the tradables sector, anoi when there is no basic social understanding about the distributive shares between these two sectors. There has to be a stark battle over distributive shares to make the policy attractive to the advocates of lhe nontradables sector.
Countries with a dive,.;iflied export sector or a poliically important intpo,t-competing sector (one thai is not fully protected by trade barri ers) are likely to have political constituencies that would fiercely op puse a real currency appreciation. File agricultural sector in many East Asian countries, for example, is based on millions of smallholders, whose sheer number give them political power. As suggested in Sachs (1985) , this difference with Latin America, where the agricultural sec tor is seen to be in the hands of a rural "oligarchy," may exp.ain the greater political opposition to currency overvaluation in East Asia and the overall greater resistance to populist measures.
Historical episodes of Latin American economic populism. The populist cycle in Latin America has been often repeatedL always with disastrous effects. The theme of this section is that tire niechanisms of expansion and collapse in the several cases have been so similar as to just!fy a clear common description of them. To demonstrate the point, we focus on four historical episodes: Argentina, !946-i949, under Juan Peroh; Chile, 1971 -1973 Brazil, 1985 --1988 and Peru, 1985-1988 , under Alan Garcia. There are many additional cases that could have been included, such as Bolivia, 1982 -1985 Brazil, 1962 Brazil, -1964 Joao Goulart; Chile, l95 2 -1 -25, under Carlos Ibanez; Mexico, 1979 and Nicaragua, 1980-1987, under the Sandini:;ta government. , 1946-1949 . Juan Peron began his rise to power in the 1943 miliiary coup, which toppled tie conservative regime that had bcen in power since the military coup of 1930. The old regime, centered on the conservative, landed interests in agriculure, was replaced by ,I nationalist and illiberal movement with a goal of rapid industrialization. Peron served first as a labor adviser to the new government, then suc cessively as L'bor secretary, minister of war, and vice president, before winning a resounding victory in the 1946 pre!idential election. Peron cultivated the political base of ,he U-bari workers as his stepping-stone to the presidency,. As labor secretary he pressed for a dramatic extension of social security benefits, collective bargaining, a system of wage bo nuses. and increases in the minimum wage. The main labor confedera tion, the Confederacion General Economica (CGT), grew enormously in strength and supported Peron's bid for the presidency.
Argentina
Peron's economic policies bctween 1946 and 1949 virtually define the mechanics of urban-hased populist policies. Monetary vnd fiscal policies were highly expansionary. The exchange rate was maintained at a fixed nominal rate, which became highly overvalued in real PPP lems.Real wages rose both because o!the expansion, and also because of direct government backing in CGT negotiations. Trade policies were highly protectionist, with the intent of building a domestic industrial base behind tariff walls. Redistributive goals were explicit: raising urban wages and squeezing the former agricultural oligarchy for the benefit of the ascendant urban sector. Wage income as a share of GNP p -vfrom 38.7 percent io f946 to 45.7 percent, just three years later, in ,949. Real wages grew by 62 percent in these three years.
The end of the boom became evident as early as 1948, when agricultural production began to drop and foreign-exchange reserves dwindled from $1.11 billion in 1946 to just $258 million in 1948. Inflation accelerated and real GNP fell by 4.5 percent in 1949.
In 1952, when Peron finally turned to a more orthodox strategy, he was candid about the social and political motivations of his original program. In a speech to a workers' delegation, cited by Mallon and Sourrouille (1975, p. 12) , Peron stated:
The justicialista [i.e., Pe'onist] economy asserts that the production of the economy should first satisfy tile necds of its inhabitants and only export the surplus; the surplus, nothing more. With this theory the boys here, of course. eat more every day and consume more, so that thl;e surplhs is smaller. But these poor guys have been submerged for fifty years: for this reason I have let thenm spend and eat and waslt everything they wanted to for five years ... but now we un doubtedly must begin ,oreorder things so as not to waste any more.
In the event, Peron had little time for such reordering, since he was ousted in a coup in 1955. , 1971-1973 . Salvador Allende, like Peron, came to power on a base of urban worker,. Allende received a slight plurality of the vote (36 percent) in th 1970 pres:dential election, and was voted into office on the basis of that plurality aftcr the electoral decision reverted to the Chilean Congress. Although Allende's program was expansionist and redistributi,e in the same mold as Peron's, there were also formal so cialist goals (e.g., widespread nationalization and extensive land re form) motivating tile program. The Popular Unity government identified three major problems with the Chilean economy: the concen ',ration of ownership of the means of prduction, the dependence of the economy on fbreign markets, and the unequal distribution of income.
Chile
In the first year of the government, the fiscal policy turned highly expansionary as the budget deficit rose from 2.7 percent of GNP in 1970 to 10.7 percent in 1971. By the fourth quarter of 1971, the rate of credit expansion to the public sector exceeded an annual rate of 300 percent. GNP growth bootned (9 percent in 1971, compared with 2.1 percent in 1970), and real wages grew by an astounding 17 percent in 1971. Labor income as a share of GNP rose from 52.3 percent in 1970 to 61.7 percent in 1971.
The crash phase catne fast, however, even faster than in Argentina. By 1972 CNP growth turned negative, and inflation jumped to 163 percent. International reserves collapsed, ieading to the implementation of a system of tight exchange controls, with fifteen different exchange rates (with a ratio from top to bottom of 60 to I). By 1973 GNP growth was -5.6 percent, with inflation averaging 5(0) percent for the year. Allende was overthrown in a military coup in September 1973.
Brazil, 1985-1988. After twenty-one years of military rule, the mili tary ceded power to a civilian president elected by an electoral college whose members had been elected in 1982. Because of the death of president-elect Tancredo Neves oil the eve ot his inauguration, vice president-elect J'se Sarney became president. Samey was truly an acci dental president. He had been selected as vice president by Neves to assuage the military, as Samey had long been a member of the conserva tive party that had suLpported the previous military regime. Samey now headed Tancredo Neves's goverment, which was supported by a broad based progressive opposition party. tile Partido Moviniento Democratico Brasiliera (PMDB), which had opposed the military rule. FPopular de mands Ian high at the time of democratization, particularly after two decades of military rule that had suppressed workers' rights and four years of'austerity in the raids: of the Latin American debt crisis.
In early 1986 Sarney endorsed the goals of the PMDB by backing a "heterodox" stabilization program called the Cruzado Plan. Whatever the original intentions of the plan with regard to fiscal and monetary instruments, it was implemented in a highly populistic faishion, with significant increases in real wages, currency overvaluation, and deficit spending. As in the Argentine and Chilean cases, the early outturn of the program was outstanding: rapid gowth, higher real wages, and low inflation. The proworker rlietoric of the regime increased markedly as the Cruzado Plan achieved its early successes.
The Cruzado Plan collapsed very fast, no doubt because of the highly unfriavorable initial conditions, especially the very high external debt inherited by the Sarney government. The Brazilian trade surplus shrank from a monthly average of about $1 billion in 1985 to a monthly deficit of' $326 million in the last quarter of' 1986. As foreign exchange reserves deteriorated. the exchange rate had to be devalued sharply in late 1986. This led to an explosion of inflation and a reversal of the real wage increases and real GDP growth that had been achieved at the outset of the program.
By 1987 a new finance minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, at tempted to shift policy toward stabilization through a reduction in the budget defic-,. (see Bresser Pereira 1988a for details). President Samey, in the midst of a political battle to maintain power for as long as possible under a new constitution then in preparation, failed to back his minister and bowed instead to the continuing populist pressures that were widely supported in the congress: Bresser consequently resigned. Moreover, real stabilization would require a social pact, but Bresser is "very skeptical about a social pact in Brazil, because first you need a political pact--a broad agreement between the main political forces in the country regarding, besides wilges, social reforms" (p. 28).
By the fall of 1989 the prospects for Brazil to avoid a hyperinfla lion still hang in the balance, with inflation 'Unning at about 35 percent per month. . 1985-1988 . After twelve years of military rule, Peru reverted to civilian rule with the c!ection of President Fernando Belaunde in 1980. The Belaunde government vacillated between the conventional austerity cum liberalization policies favored by the IMF and the .developmentalist-policies (involving heavy expenditure on public works) flavored by the president. In 1983 adverse weather conditions combined with heavy external debt payments and internal macroeco nomic im.bal.inces to produce a remarkable 12 percent decline in GNP, while domestic inflation increased to 125 percent. By the end of Belaunde's term in 1985. inflation was running at an annual rate of over 150 percent, and real wages had declined by about 40 percent between 198() and 1985.
Peru
Alan Garcia came to office in July 1985. intent on slowing infla tion while reiving real wages and growth. The president's party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionara Americana, had a long populist tradi tion and had previously been kept out of the presidency by the military, who feared the APRA's populist tendencies. Garcia bee,::n with a pol icy based on (I) a unilateral partial suspension of external debt pay ments at 10 percent of export earnings: (2) a modest devaluation and ,in increase in public sector prices, followed by exchange rate and price freezes: (3) a large increase in public sector wages, with the stated goal of raising internal demand.
Under this policy mix, the economy boomed in 1986, with GDP growing by 8.6 percent and real wages growing an astounding 26.7 percent. The public-sector deficit went from 4.4 percent of GDP in 1985 to 7.9 percent of GDP in 1986. Under the restraint of a fixed nominal exchange rate, domestic inflation slowed markedly, from 158 percent in 1985 to only 63 percent in 1986. As might be ex pected, the president's personal popularity soared, reaching an ap proval rating of more than 90 percent in 1986. As is typically true of such programs, the only telltale signs of trouble were on the exter nal front. The real exchange rate appreciated sharply, and the trade balance went from a surplus of $1,172 mil lion in 1985 to a deficit of $65 million in 1986.
In 1987 the financial aspects of the situation deteriorated further: the 1986 inflation rate approximately doubled to 114.5 percent; the public deficit widened to over 10 percent of GDP; the trade deficit worsened to $460 million: and tle real exchange rate appreciated even more. Nonetheless, growth of real wag.2s and real GDP remained high for the year.
By 1988, foreign-cxchange reserves were depleted, and the econ omy fell into total collapse. Real GDP is widely forecast to be -4 percent for the year, while inflation might top 1000 percent. In the month of September 1988 alone, prices rose by approximately 117 percent. The president's popularity plummeted to a 16 percent ap proval rating in the fall of 1988, and the press reported rumors that Garcia offered his resignation to the cabinet.
Common features of the historical episodes. A major theme of this paper is that ihe populist episodes have a common econonic arid political dynamic despite the fact that they take plac,'-in very different countries and even in different decades. We have noted several common factors: on the political side, the experiences all involve the accession to power of an urban-based government, intent on raising-sharply and quickly-the living standards of the urban workers. In three of the four cases (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, but not Chile), the new government took power after a long conservative interlude, so that social pressures were highly pent-up. On the economic side, all of the programs were characterized by an early phase of rapidly rising GNP and real wages with relatively stable prices; and a late phase of falling GNP and real wages with explosive inflation.
The turning point comes with the collapse of the fixed exchange rate because the government runs out of foreign-exchange reserves and access to new foreign credits. Indeed, the length of the upswing phase is almost wholly a function of the foreign-exchange reserves on hand for the government. In the case of Argentina under Pe:on, the wartime trade surpluses, meant that Peron intrited an enornous stockpile of reserves, Which enabled his program to continue for years without grave collapse. In Chile, Allende had a more modest initial reserve position. In Peru, Garcia created the part of the needed reserves through a policy of unilateral debt-service suspension. In Brazil, the Cruzado Plan was especially short lived since it began in the midst of a serious external debt crisis and since Sarney did not choose to emulate Garcia by suspending debt payments during the plan (interestingly, Brazil waited to suspend debt payments until after the collapse of the plan, at a time of more limited international bargaining power and less internal political cohesion).
Figures 1-6 provide a striking visual confirmation of many of these common attributes (the data and sources are given in the appen dix), In these figures, we superimpose the experiences of the four episodes, dating them according to the start of the populist policy measures. Figure I shows GDP growth: in all cases, growth starts high, and turns negative in year four. Note that the 1988 growth rates for Brazil and Peru are forecasts taken from the financial press as of September 1988. In Argentina, Chile, and Peru, growth actually accel erates from year one to year two, then slows in year three, and turns negative in year four. In the Argentine, Chilean, and Peruvian cases, the downturn in the fourth year was very sharp-GDP fell by more than 4 percent. Figure 2 shows inflation rates, which also exhibit similar patterns. In all four countries, the populist episode begins with a slowdown of inflation, which seems to come about because of the fixity of the nominal exchange rate during each episode. By year three, the inflation begins to accelerate-sharply in the case of Brazil, where the Cruzado Plan collapsed with remarLzablc quickness. Remarkably, by year four in Brazil, Chile, and Peru, inflation has reached several hundred percent. In Argentina, inflation, at just over 30 percent, reached levels that were high in comparison with the price stability Argentina experienced in __ FIGURE 1
Annual GDP Growth under Populist Policies (percent) -2 "-. the late 1930s and early 1940s, but very low in comparison with later years. Peron started his program in an economy with very low infia tionary expectations and a large inherited stock of foreign-exchange reserves. Figure 3 shows that real wage growth, a crucial target of populist policies, is strong through the first two years, slows down in the third year, and finally collapses as the balance of payments crisis hits the economy. In Chile in 1973, real wages fell by 32 percent; in Peru in 1988, real wages fell by 34.5 percent, ard in Brazil in 1988, real wages in Rio de Janeiro fell by 12.8 percent, following a decline of 16 percent in 1987.10
Figures 4 through 6 illustrate the external :;ector-the Achilles' heel of all the experiments. As shown in Figure 4 , export volumes fall relative to GDP in all of the countries, and Figure 5 shows that the ratio of international reserves to imports plummets in the second year of the program in each country. One major reason for this collapse is shown in Figure 6 : the steady and significant apprecia tion of the real exchange rate, where the real exchange rate is de fined in this figure as the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar, divided by the ratio of the consumer price index of the home coun try to the consumer price index of the United States. In all four countries the real exchange rate appreciates sharply in the course of the program, by as much as 25 to 30 percent by year four. We have already noted that this appreciation helps to explain the initial rise in the real wage, as well as the decline in net exports and international reserves.
Conclusions
A great many of Latin America's economic problems in the 1980s are due to external factors. Real interest rates reached unexpected and unprecedented levels throughout the world in the 1980s. These levels resulted in an enormous drain of resources from Latin American debtor countries to the creditor world. Prices for Latin America's leading export commodities collapsed, often falling in real terms to the lowest levels in half a century or more. In many countries, fragile democratic 
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governments had to try to pick up the pieces from the rubble-in human, political, and economic terms--ft by earlier military regimes. Nonetheless, Latin America cannot fully escape responsibility for the current crisis. The debt crisis has hit hardest in countries with a long tradition of fiscal laxity. In many cases, that laxity has hit shock ing proportions, particularly when governments have used drastic fis cal expansions to try to solve deep-seated problems of economic inequality and poverty. This paper has shown that these populist mea. sures tend to collapse in a remarkable burst of inflation and falling real wages when the fiscal expansion hits the balance-of-payments con straint.
As suggested above, the impulse for populist measures follows from several factors, including an environment of deep economic con flict rooted in a highly unequal distribution of income; political insta bility, leading to governments with short expected tenure and equally short time horizons; and a deep cleavage between the perceived inter ests of the urban working class and primary commodity exporters. And yet, a major puzzle remains. The populist episodes we have reviewed ended in collapse, sometimes even in tragedy. Peron was forced into exile, leaving a weakened economy and a society both politicized and deeply divided: Allende died in a military coup that destroyed democ racy in Chile for the next fifteen years: Sarney and Garcia now preside over failed regimes. each facing the real danger of a hyperinflation and economic collapse. Why did these leaders opt for such a dangerous strategy? At least Brazil and Peru should have had the benefit of Argentina's and Brazil's experiences. Perhaps the most accurate, and also simplest. answer is that these leaders, and even more their follow ers, did not understand the riskiness of the course they selected. Popu list policies look remarkably good at the beginning of the populist cycle. It is only the hopeless pessimist that raises doubts in the midst of a boom that causes real wages to rise sharply while keeping inflatioo under control (or even cutting inflation, as in Brazil and Peru). Presi dents Peron, Sarney, and Garcia reached remarkable levels of popular ity in the early stages of their programs. The problem of falling foreign-exchange reserves looks like a technical nuisance at this stage. Something will come up, each leader reasoned: new loans, a cut in world interest rates, a surge of exports (deus e.v machina), even a debt rnoraorium or exchange controls if necessary. After all, what is a little inconvenience in foreign trade if the benefits are a real wage boom and rapid growth?! In truth, the situation may be difficult even when the leader under stands the difficulties, if his followers (in congress, in the unions, and on the streets) do not. The pressures for redistribution may be too much to resist if the congress is pushing hard for more spending and siding with important constituencies toward that end. In Brazil, the finance ministers in 1987 and 1988 understood well the dangers of the fiscal expansion, but were powerless to resist a president who, in turn, was bowing to populist pressures in the Brazilian congress.
The lack of perspective is not limited to politicians. Various schools of "structuralist" thought in economics continue to advocate measures along populist lines. There is no better evidence of this than the self-congratulatory volume El Peru Heterodoxo: Un Modelo Economico (Carbonetto 1987) , published in 1987 by the technical analysts that designed the ill-fated Peruvian pro3rain. Just on the eve of the collapse of the program (as liquid foreign-exchange re serves were finally depleted), the book appeared, with the following pronouncement.
At the moment of sending this book to print we close the first year and-a-half of the application of the reactivation policies in Peru. The [economic] data obtained corroborate, on the whole, the thesis that it is possible to reactivate an economy (when one has excess capacity) and, at the same time, to reduce the level of inflation.
In this year-and-a-half, Peru reduced its inflation from 250 percent annually to around 65 percent annually, and raised its GNP by more than 8 percent per year. Nonetheless, the same success obtained in this process of reactiva tion opens up unknowns which could be called the second stage of development of the Peruvian economic model. These unknowns refer to the e'c.ent of savings-investment and the export capacity of the Peruvian economy in the immediate future (p. 16, my transla tion).
Unfortunately, the authors failed to recognize that the failure of the second stage-to develop adequate savings and exports-is the logical result of the "success" of the first stage. Sadly, by September 1988, Peruvian expolts had collapsed and the economy had entered into a hyperinflation. As of September 1988, the government wa'; attempting to make an emergency turn toward fisca' stabilization.
This problem of' understanding is undoubtedly complicated by the absence of adequate "institutional memory" in most Latin American governments. With every change of government there is a complete overhaul in public-sector personnel, extending far down into the bu reaucracy. In modern Japan, by contrast, only the minister is replaced when the government changes-all other positions are based on inter nal promotion within the ministries. In Latin America the result is the absence of normal bureaucratic restraint in the design of major initia tives. The president and his immediate advisers can launch a funda menal change in direction-subject, of course, to his remaining in office.
In closing, it is important to stress a point of view also expressed at the beginning. The political and moral impulses underlying the popu list policies are understandable and indeed often noble. The income distribution in Latin America is a reason for moral concern and a provocation to action. Moreover, many actions of populist govern ments (such as the debt moratoria of Peru and Brazil in the 1980s, or the "heterodox" shocks of Argentina in 1985 and Brazil in 1986 that attempted to control inertial intlation) may be meritorious even though they are highly controversial and a part of an otherwise ill-designed
Finally, the populist excesses do not prove the merit of extreme orthodox policies that often ftollow the populist collapse. Too many opponents of populism dismiss real problems of income distribution and are content to balance budgets without concern for the distributio nal consequences. The failures of Latin Arnerican populism should prompt a search for a middle path rather than being read as an endorse ment of unfettered orthodoxy. This paper has naturally raised .ore questions than it has answered. Do the social and political factors described in the paper explain not only the Latin American temptation toward populism but also the rela tive absence of populist policies in East Asia? Do the "pacted democra cies" of Colombia and Venezuela provide a model for achieving political stability in other countries in the region, and do the experiences of those two countries support the hypothesis that political stability contributes io fiscal responsibility'? What are the most effective ways for Latin America to address the long-standing crisis in income in equality and a, the same time encourage price stability, private invest ment, and accumulation? These great issues provide an agenda for future study of the political economy of the region, an agenda that would have benefited greatly from the attention and insights of Ezio Tarantelli. 6. Other variables that helped to account for the cross-country pattern of debt reschedulings were ( I ) the nature of trade policy (more outward-oriented economies were less likely to have rescheduled); (2) the importance of agri culture in the economy (countries in which agriculture comprised a large share of GNP were less likely to have rescheduled): and (3) per capita income (wealthier countries were less likely to have succumbed to debt rescheduling).
APPENDIX
7. For an excellent series of articles on the politics and history of Latin American populism, see the volume edited by .
8. In the model in Sachs (1989) . consumption is assumed to fall exclu sively on nontradeables. All production of exportables goes abroad, and all imports are used as intermediate inputs in nontradeables production. The specific as:wmptions about the consumption basket should obviously be var ied by countr'. In Argentina, the primary exportable commodity-mainly grains and meat-is also a consumption g,,od, in Chile, the traditional primary exportable--copper-is not. On the import side. most imports are either inter mediate goods or capital goods. Because of traditional import-substitution, importing consumer goods is usually highly restricted.
9. The Sandinista experiment is often interpreted as a distinct, revolution ary experiment. In my view, such an interpretation exaggerates the novelty of the Sandinista policy direction, which is firmly rooted in the Latin American populist tradition. Note that by 1987, the combination of popul;st initiatives and the heavy wartime burden contributed to an inflation rate of about 11,000 percent.
10. The 1988 data for Peni. and the 1987 and 1988 data for Rio de Janeiro are from ECLAC (1988) . The 1988 data are provisional. Note that in Brazil, there is a big discrepancy between the sharp fall of real wages in Rio de Janeiro and the much more moderate decline in Sio Paulo (where wages fell by only about 2 percent between 1986 and 1988).
11. Alan Garcia's declaration in 1985 that Peru needed debt relief-the choice for Peru was "debt or democracy"-was accurate. Given the collapsed state of the Peruvian economy and society in 1985, the possiblity of servicing debt on !he temis of the international community was negligible. The debt moratorium need not be di-nmissed as wrong simply because it was accompa nied by unwise internal macroeconomic policies. Between 1985 and 1988, Peru's neighbor, Bolivia, demonstrated the utility of a strategy of debt mora torium combined with orthodox internal policies. See Bresser Pereira (1988b) for a cogent explanation of the Brazilian debt-servicing moratorium of 1987.
